i.e. Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal (European Commission 1998; Schneider 1997 ).
Nevertheless, the tax burden is particularly heavy not only in Greece and in Italy, but also in the Scandinavian countries, and even in Austria (Oecd 1997) , which displays a very reduced proportion of underground economy. But the most striking evidence regards the South of Italy with respect to the rest of the country. In fact, these Southern regions are characterised both by a less developed economic structure and by a more widespread underground economy, though sharing the same tax system and other regulations, if not lighter, with the Northern regions. These facts can be explained by looking at the different kinds of the underground activities. In the Mediterranean countries or regions the practice of not registering labour is usual for both the firms, though at a different degree, and for the private employees, who alternatively must face unemployment with no social benefit. The economic structure thus mainly consists of small firms, which can compensate technological inefficiencies by means of low unregistered labour cost (Donolo and Capparucci 1999 ; Commissione Lavoro della Camera dei Deputati 1998). By contrast, in the Northern countries or regions of Europe and in the US the unregistered work is typically of secondary importance, often pursued by those who are already employed 2 . Therefore, it can be identified the stylised fact that links a widespread underground economy with inefficient techniques, few and small units and low output, and conversely for a small proportion of underground activities in the economy.
It may be thought that development, and thus the reduction of the underground economy, is an automatic process. However, this does not seem always the case. The analysis of convergence of percapita GDP in the European regions clearly shows that many poor regions tend to stagnate, or even that they converge toward a low income club of regions (Tondl 1997; Paci 1997) . Even more clearly recent trends in many regions of South Italy, together with the persistent, if not increasing, diffusion of underground practices, may suggest the existence of an underdevelopment trap.
This paper is a first attempt to study the interaction between the underground economy and the economic structure as characterised by the size and the number of firms, as well as by the overall productivity and output. It is able to represent the case of an economy which is trapped into an equilibrium of a high proportion of underground activity, small sized and few 1 Tanzi (1999) , by surveying the literature, observes that these estimates, in percentage of the GDP, "range from 1.4% to 47.1% for Canada, and from 6.2% to 19.4 for the US […] In Germany [they range] from 14.5 to 31.4". 2 Another component of unregistered work is due to immigrants, but its relative importance may be great both in the richest countries and regions, as well as in the other areas (European Commission 1998; Petersen 1998). firms, and an overall low productivity and output. Conversely, it is possible to represent an economy in a better equilibrium, where the characteristics are reversed.
The theoretical literature on the underground economy in a general equilibrium setting is not wide, and it is mainly concentrated to study the effects of fiscal policy, while no or less attention is paid to the performance of the different firms, or to other characterisations of the economic structure (Bental et al. 1985; Ginsburgh 1985; Bennett 1990; Agenor and Aizenman 1999; De Geijsel 1985) . The problem of determining an interior solution for the proportion of the underground economy is usually solved by distinguishing between two goods, officially and unofficially produced, and thus two kinds of demand for them 3 . Instead, in Rauch (1991) the economic structure is characterised by the allocation of heterogeneous entrepreneurship between the sectors, one informal and the other formal, and by the smaller and less productive firms of the former. This approach can provide an interior solution although both output and labour are homogeneous, but it does not avoid the assumption of specialised firms in the two sectors, which is often unrealistic 4 .
The model presented here is in line with this approach, but it is also able to deal with mixed firms, i.e. employing both unregistered and official labour. It assumes that the potential entrepreneur, depending on his ability to better train official labour, and on the given possibility to evade the fiscal burden on labour, chooses the best mix, thus also choosing the technique for producing a same good. The second key feature of the model, which intends to capture an important aspect of industrialisation, is to assume Marshallian externalities among firms. This assumption, combined with the given distribution of entrepreneurial talent, makes two general stable equilibria possible: one "good", and one "bad". This result suggests that development and the underground activity can be induced into a trap. A refinement of the model could better specify the behaviour of the workers, here assumed as homogeneous, and with a very simplistic (and implicit) utility function.
The paper is organised as follows: section 1 sets out the assumptions of the model, section 2 and 3 develop the solution of the model, section 4 carries out some exercises of comparative statics, and draws policy considerations, section 5 concludes, while three appendices show the mathematical proofs.
3 Alternatively, De Gijsel (1985) adopts a Nash solution, as due to different preferences of both the employers and workers between official and unregistered work. Bonatti (2000) fixes the numbers of firms in the legal sector and in the informal sector. 4 The approach of allocation of entrepreneurial talent goes back to Lucas (1978) , and then developed by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) . A first application to the study of the underground economy is in Pugno (2000) .
The Assumptions of the Model
Let us assume that many firms competitively produce one good by using homogeneous labour in two different ways, either by registering it and paying taxes and contributions on it, or not registering it, thus avoiding this fiscal burden.
The different treatment of labour by firms is brought here a step further, i.e. in the techniques of production. In fact, in the case of official labour some rules and norms, as usually established through private contracts or by unions, are applied, but they are not in the case of unregistered labour. When workers are officially employed, the relationship between them and firms is more stable and more closely integrated, and this makes it possible, or only easier, the rising and the implementation of workers' learning activities, either unintentional, such as 'learning by doing', or intentional, such as 'training on the job'. Both types of learning activities are assimilable to specific investments that can take place only with stable relationships (Acemoglu 1997 , Burdett and Smith 1996 , Stevens 1994 . Secondly, the 'fairness' of the rules that regulate official labour may affect the learning process. The greater the 'fairness' the harder the worker's effort in the learning activity. On the contrary, unregistered labour usually does not imply stable and systematic relationship between workers and firms, then a learning process rarely occurs or it does not happen at all. In order to capture these facts, two different techniques of production are assumed, depending on the official or unregistered labour employed.
Formally, the microeconomic production function specifies two different efficiencies for labour as follows:
where y indicates the only output of this economy whose price is the numeraire, i is the index for a finite real set of firms, the total number of which will be determined by the model, l l and l s are the official and the unregistered labour employed respectively.
A further crucial assumption of the model is that the efficiency of official labour is higher, the greater is the ability of the entrepreneur who runs the firm. The underlying idea is that legal workers learn more if the entrepreneur is abler. Hence, the assumption is also of heterogeneous firms because of heterogeneous entrepreneurs' ability. More precisely, it is assumed that entrepreneurs' ability depends on two factors: the individual heterogeneous entrepreneurial talent, and the positive externalities arising from the existing firms.
Entrepreneurial talent is an exogenous individual's endowment, which can be thought of with a fixed distribution over population (cf. Baumol 1990) . The externalities are of the Marshallian type, and intend to capture the typical effects of the industrial district. In fact, a crucial feature for the development of an industrial district is that firms are sufficiently numerous over a given area, so that they can display productive inter-relatedness 5 . Hence, externalities may not be linear in the number of firms, but rather, they can experience an acceleration when the industrial district is establishing.
Formally, let us assume the following equation:
( is the individual talent, assumed as different among individuals, so that these can be ranked in descending order of talent according to the following distribution function:
where E i indicates the i-th more talented individual 6 .
The function T is increasing in E, and, in particular, it is assumed of the logistic type,
i.e. with a concave and then a convex part until a maximum for +∞ → E . This function can also be interpreted as the pattern of diffusion of entrepreneurial knowledge over population (Rogers 1983 ).
The ability function (2) thus has two decreasing traits at the extreme, where decreasing talent prevails, and it can have an increasing trait in the middle, where externality can prevail (see Fig.1 ). In fact, in the first trait the number of firms is too little to effect sufficient externalities, in the second trait the diffusion process may be so intense as to overcome the decreasing effect of the talent endowments, in the third trait externalities approach exhaustion.
The cost function includes official labour, as weighted by the fiscal burden, and the unregistered labour, which is burdened, however, with some weight, because of the risk to be fined. A third cost component is assumed: a fixed cost of effort to enter the market. Thus:
where c i is the total cost for the firm, w l and w s are wage rates of official and unregistered labour respectively, t is the tax rate, and p is the probability to be fined with amount of m, while the fixed cost is indicated by c .
The labour market is populated by a fixed number of individuals: L L = . They have an identical utility function linear in consumption and derive no disutility from supplying labour. Each individual is endowed with a one-unit flow of labour offered inelastically.
Therefore L is also equal to the aggregate flow of labour supply. Finally, the labour market is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
Microeconomic Equilibrium
Firms choose the amount of official and of unregistered labour by maximising total profits given by:
where π i is the total profits, inclusive of the quasi-rent earned by the entrepreneurs as far as they are able. The two labour demands for official and unregistered labour respectively, derived from first order conditions, are: By substituting equations (6), (7) into eqs. (1) and (4), and then into the profit function, we obtain the following expression for the above condition:
As concerns workers, they may choose to work as official or as unregistered worker according to which one assures a higher indirect utility. Given the assumptions on the utility function, this decision rule becomes:
S l w w ≥ .
General Equilibrium
This economy will be in equilibrium if three conditions hold: no more firm enters or leaves the market; no more worker changes the type of work; labour market is in equilibrium.
Given the assumption of free entry, the first equilibrium condition implies that for the marginal entrepreneur, who is the less able, 0 = * π , while the second condition implies that wages of official and unregistered workers in equilibrium will be equal. Finally the third condition is the usual market clearing condition for which aggregate labour supply is equal to the aggregate labour demand.
By substituting the optimal values for l l and l S (equations (6) and (7) This curve, which resembles the B(E) curve, shows different combinations of wage and number of active firms, the marginal of which exhibits zero profit. Hence, it does not reflect the technological conditions of the infra-marginal firms. These firms enjoy both the externalities given by the number of active firms like all the others, and their own higher talent, thus earning positive profits. All firms take externalities as given, while the curve in Fig.2 depicts the conditions where externalities are endogenous.
The labour market equilibrium condition is:
where L is the aggregate labour supply equals to the population, while
are the aggregate demands of official and illegal workers respectively.
9
Substituting eqs. (6) and (7) 
Equation (12) shows different combinations of wage and number of firms that assure the equilibrium in the labour market. Obviously the relationship between wage and number of firms is positive since eq. (12) reflects the labour supply constraint.
By solving the system formed by equations (10) and (12), we find the wage and the number of firms that assure the macroeconomic equilibrium. At this regard we have the following :
Proposition 1 There exists at least one equilibrium that gives the wage for which labour market clears and no firm enters or leaves the market. Moreover, there may be also multiple equilibria, one of which is unstable and two stable. The first stable-equilibrium is characterised by a wage and a number of firms lower than those of the second stableequilibrium.
Proof: see appendix 1 Proof: see appendix 2.
The case of multiple equilibria, which are Pareto-ranked, is particularly interesting, since it implies the possibility that the economy, at an initial stage of its development, can be induced into an underdevelopment trap. In fact for equal values of parameters the economy with a low number of firms is attracted towards the Pareto-inferior equilibrium, where firms, on average, are of smaller size and use illegal labour more intensively.
Comparative Statics and Policy Considerations
In order to pursue a precise comparative static analysis we need to rewrite the market equilibrium condition in an explicit form. For this reason we assume that T(E) takes the following form: From eqs (10) and (12), we can write the equilibrium condition that gives the equilibrium number of firms. 
Proof. (see appendix 3).
Proposition 3 shows a very interesting result since, given the initial conditions of the economy, it allows to single out which is the most appropriate policy. In fact, if the economy is characterised by few firms and a large labour supply, such as case (a) shown in the previous section, proposition 3 suggests that the most appropriate policy is to improve economic environment for increasing externalities, so that the number of firms rises, and thus the level of aggregate output. By contrast, a policy which makes heavier the fiscal burden of illegal workers has an expansive effect on the equilibrium number of firms only in cases like case (c)
shown previously, where the number of firms is great and the labour market tends to be short of supply.
Most interesting results emerge from case (b). In fact, in this case we have two stable general equilibria: a 'bad' equilibrium and an 'good' equilibrium; the first one if compared to the 'high' equilibrium, is Pareto-inferior and is characterised by less firms and a higher average ratio between illegal and legal workers. One implication of proposition 3 is that if the economy is in the Pareto-inferior equilibrium, or nearby, a policy that makes stronger the externalities can be very effective since it may increase the number of firms until it reaches the 'critical' mass beyond which the economy can be attracted towards the Pareto-superior equilibrium, where the aggregate output is larger and the ratio between illegal and legal workers is lower.
By contrast, policy aimed to reduce the use of illegal workers by making fiscal controls and punishment more severe has an expansive effect only if the economy is in the 'good' equilibrium, since it raises the number of firms and then the level of activity.
Therefore in case of 'undervelopment trap' policies aimed to improve the 'quality' of economic environment have to be preferred to policies that directly reduce the illegal sector.
Conclusions
The theoretical literature on the underground economy is very little and most concentrated on the microeconomic aspects of tax evasion. The phenomenon of the underground economy is instead recognised as important by the empirical studies, which also reveal that it is not evenly distributed, but it is more widespread in the less developed areas.
This fact has driven the present paper, which namely attempts to explain the different coexistence of the underground economy with the official economy in a more developed area with respect to a less one.
Unfortunately, the underground economic behaviours are very heterogeneous, and not even much observable, so that they cannot be easily stylised. Nevertheless, a few plausible hypotheses can be made to capture some important features of this phenomenon. First, firms hire labour without registration only partly, side by side with official employees. Secondly, firms use the two different kinds of labour more in a complementary way rather than in a substitutable way, because official labour implies a more stable relationship with the entrepreneur, so that a higher efficiency may ensue. Thirdly, entrepreneurship is important to explain the emergence of the firm from the small-sized and low-productive processes, largely based on unregistered labour. Fourthly, entrepreneurship depends, over a given area, on the individual talent, which can be very heterogeneous, and, over different areas, on the density of the enterprises, which likely performs positive externalities. In particular, the literature on the industrial districts points out the importance of a critical density, which allows an acceleration in economic development.
On the basis of these hypotheses the proposed model is able to draw the following results:
-a both micro-and macro-economic equilibrium exists where firms find it convenient to employ both unregistered and official labour;
-the degree of emergence from underground depends on the entrepreneurship and the relative fiscal burden, and it affects the size, the number, productivity, and output of the firms;
-if a critical density of enterprises exists, two equilibria can be determined: a "bad" equilibrium where the economy is populated by few small firms, with low productivity and output, and with a large use of unregistered labour, and a "good" equilibrium with reversed features, thus characterising a more developed area;
-policy measures aimed at contrasting the underground activities, like pursuing more fiscal controls, are effective in a developed area, while they worsen the economic conditions in a less developed area; -policy measures aimed at improving the economic environment, and thus externalities for firms, are effective in the less developed areas, and they may even trigger an endogenous acceleration toward the "good" equilibrium. By contrast, in the more developed ones they incur in the rising costs due to labour shortage.
The equation (12) is increasing in E. In fact:
This expression is always positive since 0
. On the other hand the zero-profit curve has at least one decreasing trait (see fig. 2 ). This implies that the two curves intersect at least once.
Moreover, given that zero-profit curve changes its course twice, it may happen that curves intersect each other three times: two in the descending traits of the zero-profit curve, and one in the increasing trait. 
It is easy to see that the derivative of this expression with respect to E* is positive. Hence, along the labour market equilibrium curve a larger number of firms produces a greater amount of aggregate output. In the "good" equilibrium B(E) is greater since the intersection between the two curves takes place at a greater value of wage. Therefore g i in the high equilibrium is lower. 
